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Abstract
The quality of hosts for a parasitoid wasp may be influenced by attributes such as host
size or species, with high quality for successful development usually coincident with high
quality for larger offspring. This is not always the case: for the Scelionid wasp Trissolcus
basalis, oviposition in eggs of the Brown Marmorated Stink Bug, Halyomorpha halys, rather
than of the normal host, the Southern Green Stink Bug, Nezara viridula, leads to lower
offspring survival, but survivors can be unusually large. Adult female T. basalis engage in
contests for host access. As larger contestants are typically favoured in contests between
parasitoids, the larger size of surviving offspring may compensate for the mortality of
others. We construct a general game-theoretic model to explore whether size advantage
can sustain a maternal preference to utilize a more deadly host species. We find that size
advantage alone is unlikely to sustain a shift in host preference, yet such an outcome is
possible when size asymmetries act simultaneously with advantages in host possession
(ownership effect). H. halys is an invasive pest of major agro-economic importance in
Europe and the Americas, and use of its eggs as hosts by native parasitoids such as T.
basalis has been seen as an evolutionary trap due to high developmental mortality. Our
model suggests that the recently discovered effect of host choice on offspring size may
provide an escape from the trap via effects on contest biology of T. basalis which could
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foster a more stable association with H. halys. An evolutionary shift in the reproductive
value of H. halys could increase the efficiency of T. basalis as a biological control agent of
this invasive stink bug pest.
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Juvenile parasitoid wasps develop on the resources provided by the body of a single
host. The quality and quantity of the resource can be influenced by, for instance, the host’s
size and by its developmental stage and these attributes may then be manifest in terms of
parasitoid developmental mortality and/or the size, fecundity and longevity of surviv-
ing offspring, all of which are components of evolutionary fitness (Godfray, 1994). Many
species of parasitoids can develop from several or even many species of hosts (oligophagy
and polyphagy, respectively) and variation, in terms of nutritional composition, size and
defences against parasitism, between host species can be a major determinant of para-
sitoid fitness parameters, in turn influencing host acceptance decisions by foraging adult
females.
In some parasitoids, development in a given host species may negatively influence
the probability of offspring survival to adulthood and yet positively influence the char-
acteristics of those offspring that do survive. This is the case in Trissolcus basalis (Hy-
menoptera: Sceleonidae): oviposition into eggs of the invasive Brown Marmorated Stink
Bug (Halyomorpha halys, Hemiptera: Pentatomidae) leads to far lower offspring survival
(with estimates ranging from 0− 6% (Rondoni et al., 2017; Peri et al., 2020) to 38% Balusu
et al. (2019) than oviposition into eggs of its main host, the Southern Green Stink Bug
(Nezara viridula, Hemiptera: Pentatomidae) (Cusumano et al., 2011; Peri et al., 2020), but
female offspring that survive are typically much larger (25% increase in tibia length, Peri
et al., 2020). Among adult female parasitoid wasps, larger size is generally associated
with higher fecundity (Hardy et al., 1992) and foraging ability (Karsai et al., 2006; Visser,
1994). One aspect of foraging is the ability to competitively acquire and subsequently
defend hosts or patches of hosts against other foraging females, and female T. basalis en-
gage in such contests (Field & Calbert, 1998). Across the parasitoid Hymenoptera, larger
contestants are typically favoured in agonistic interactions between adults (Hardy et al.,
2013) and such body size effects can influence reproductive decisions by foraging females
in a game-theoretic manner (e.g. clutch size optima, (Mesterton-Gibbons & Hardy, 2004;
Goubault et al., 2007).
Here we develop a game-theoretic model to address the following general question:
Can size advantage in contests among adults sustain a preference for a more deadly (in
terms of offspring developmental mortality) host by foraging females? For greatest gen-
erality, and with future work in mind, we first formulate the model (in §2 and especially
Appendix A) in terms of a five-dimensional parameter space. The parameters are: 1. The
reproductive value of the more deadly host relative to that of the natural host, α; 2. The
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proportion of hosts that are of the more deadly species, θ; 3. The probability that a host
is never found, k; The probability a large wasp outcompetes a normal wasp relative to
the probability a normal wasp outcompetes a large wasp, λ; and 5. The owner advantage,
increase in probability beyond 0.5 of owner winning contest with intruder of equal size, ρ.
The model thus integrates non-contest (α, θ, k) and contest-related (λ, ρ) considerations.
All five parameters are dimensionless and in principle measurable, but in practice their
measurement has yet to be addressed by empirical studies. As clarity of prediction in the-
oretical work decreases with the numbers of parameters considered, we then focus (§3) on
the subset of the parameter space where size advantage in contests is most relevant, thus
reducing the dimension of the parameter space from five to two. We subsequently revisit
the higher-dimensional parameter space (§4) and in our concluding discussion (§5).
Our model has a wide set of potential applications, given that species invasions are
likely to occur increasingly frequently due to both international transport and global cli-
mate change, and that invasive species will be encountered by resident natural enemies
with which they have not co-evolved (Berthon, 2015; Abram et al., 2017), leading to a
range of possible empirical values of the parameters we consider. The model is nonethe-
less of most immediate use in considering the invasion of European and American crop-
ping systems by the Brown Marmorated Stink Bug (Rice et al., 2014; Leskey & Nielsen,
2018) as the use of its eggs as hosts by native parasitoids such as T. basalis has been seen
as an evolutionary trap due to the high developmental mortality of offspring (Abram
et al., 2014; Costi et al., 2020). However, the recently discovered effects of host species on
offspring size may provide an escape from the trap by providing a fitness advantage to
surviving offspring via enhanced performance in contests for future hosts.
2. Mathematical model
For the sake of simplicity, we consider a population of female-producing female par-
asitoids (thelytoky). Likewise for simplicity, we assume that there are only two adult
body sizes, large and normal, and that each egg surviving on a more deadly (Halyomor-
pha hyalis-like) host becomes a large adult, whereas each egg surviving on a natural host
becomes a normal adult.
This population consists of three different types or strategies, distinguished by the
type of host they are willing to exploit. A C-strategist is the customary obligate exploiter
of natural hosts, so its progeny are always of normal size. A D-strategist is an obligate
exploiter of the more deadly host (e.g., H. hyalis), so its progeny are always large. A
U-strategist is an undiscerning exploiter: its progeny are normal or large according to
whether it happens to have exploited a natural host or a more deadly one. Let these three
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types occur in proportions x1, x2 and x3, respectively, so that C is strategy 1, D is strategy
2 and U is strategy 3.
As in Mesterton-Gibbons & Hardy (2004), we assume that an animal’s reward is the
expected number of surviving offspring from a suitable host. Without loss of generality,
let the value of a natural host in terms of the average number of surviving offsprint from
it be defined as the unit of fitness, and let the corresponding value of a more deadly
host be α units, where α < 1 because the parasitoid has much higher developmental
mortality on the more deadly host (94%) compared with levels observed on the natural
host (16%) (Peri et al., 2020). Note that α represents parasitoid survival and fecundity
on a more deadly host relative to that on a natural host, with “natural” developmental
mortality and fecundity built into the unit of fitness by our definition. For example, with
95% mortality on a more deadly host compared to 20% on natural hosts but with the
same fecundity we would have α = 0.05/0.8 = 0.0625; whereas if in addition survivors
from more deadly hosts were three times as fecund as natural survivors we would have
α = 3× 0.05/0.8 = 0.1875.
We assume that the frequencies of more deadly and natural hosts are θ and 1 − θ, re-
spectively, and hence that more deadly and natural hosts are located at rates proportional
to θ and 1 − θ. Correspondingly, in the absence of differential survival and fecundity,
progeny of a U-strategist would be θ
1−θ
times as likely to be large as to be normal. How-
ever, an egg is only α times as likely to survive and reproduce on a more deadly host as
on a natural one. Hence progeny of a U-strategist are only α · θ
1−θ
times as likely to be
large as to be normal. So the probability that a randomly selected U-strategist is large or
normal is ωL or ωN , respectively, where
ωL =
αθ
αθ + 1− θ , ωN =
1− θ
αθ + 1− θ . (1)
Note that we assume
0 < α, θ < 1 (2)
throughout, so that (1) implies 0 < ωL, ωN < 1 as well.
We assume that, in contests between two large or between two normal individuals,
where neither has any advantage in terms of size, it is possible that prior ownership may
confer an advantage instead. Specifically, in a contest between two individuals of equal








with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. We refer to ρ as owner advantage: it measures the extent beyond
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equiprobability to which an owner is favoured to win in the event of a fight between
equals.
In contests between large and normal individuals, however, greater size does confer
an advantage on the larger individual. Let a large individual be λ times more likely to
win against an individual of normal size than it would if it were itself of normal size,
where λ > 1. Then in a contest between a large owner and an intruder of normal size, the
owner wins with probability qOL and the intruder wins with probability qIN , where
qOL =
λ(1 + ρ)
1− ρ+ λ(1 + ρ) , qIN =
1− ρ
1− ρ+ λ(1 + ρ) . (4)
Likewise, in a contest between a normal owner and a large intruder, the owner wins with
probability qON and the intruder wins with probability qIL, where
qON =
1 + ρ
1 + ρ+ λ(1− ρ) , qIL =
λ(1− ρ)
1 + ρ+ λ(1− ρ) . (5)
As in Mesterton-Gibbons & Hardy (2004), we assume that there is a narrow time-
window in which a parasitoid can actually acquire a host and thus that each host is the
subject of at most one contest. To be able to reproduce, females must either find a suitable
unguarded host and defend it against at most one intruder or take over a suitable guarded
host in a contest.
Let Z(T ) be the probability that a host is located by time T ; let Y (T ) be the probability
that a host is located some time after time T ; and let k be the probability that a host is
never found (during the entire vulnerable period of its development). Then multiplying
the probability 1−Z(T ) that a host has not been found at time T by the probability 1−Y (T )
that it is not subsequently found yields
(1− Z(T ))(1− Y (T )) = k (6)
for any T : the bigger the value of Z(T ), the smaller the value of Y (T ). We assume that
time to next arrival at the host follows an exponential distribution with parameter a, so
that Z(T ) = 1− e−aT , Y (T ) = 1− e−a(p−T ) and
k = e−aT e−a(p−T ) = e−ap (7)
by (6), where p denotes the length of the vulnerable period of development for a host.
We further assume that location time T for a focal individual is uniformly distributed
between 0 and p, so that the average probability of a host being unguarded is











where E denotes expected value.
We can now proceed to calculate expressions for the fitnesses to each of the three
strategies, which appear in Appendix A. These expressions depend explicitly on α, θ, ρ,
λ and k (both directly and indirectly through γ), but do not depend directly on either a
or p, whose effect on fitness is subsumed by k through (7). We therefore regard α, θ, ρ, λ
and k as the five dimensionless parameters of the model. The corresponding evolution of
the strategy frequencies is governed by the replicator equations (Taylor & Jonker, 1978;
Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998). For i = 1, 2, 3, let Wi denote the fitness to strategy i, whose
frequency is xi. Then the governing equations are
dxi
dt
= xi{Wi −W}, i = 1, . . . , 3, (9)






is the average fitness of the entire population. Note that, because
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, (11)
the first two equations in (9) imply the third, which therefore we do not need for the
analysis that follows.
3. Analysis of the reduced model
The expressions for fitness calculated in Appendix A in general depend on the strategy
frequencies x1, x2, x3 and on the five dimensionless parameters α, θ, ρ, λ and k, and
in general are too complex for tractable analysis. Therefore, we focus our attention on
the important limit as a → 0 in (7), in which all hosts are eventually found, and thus
contest behaviour is most relevant. In this limit, which can be regarded as the limit of
high parasitoid density, the expressions for fitness simplify significantly (Appendix B).
Because the correct expressions for fitness are obtained by setting k = 0 and hence γ = 0
in (A.6), (A.9) and (A.17), we will refer to this limit largely as the k = 0 limit (as opposed
to the a → ∞ limit). To make things as simple as possible, however, we now also assume
that there is no owner advantage and that greater size is always decisive in a contest, in
the sense that a large individual always wins agains a normally sized one. Thus ρ = 0,
λ → ∞ in addition to k = 0, and (3)–(5) reduce to
q0 = qI =
1
2
, qOL = qIL = 1, qON = qIN = 0. (12)
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We refer to this model as our reduced model. The evolution of the population now de-
pends only on two dimensionless parameters, namely, the relative value α and frequency
θ of the more deadly host, and on the proportions x1, x2 of C and D strategists, with the
proportion x3 of U implied by (11).
In a theoretical exploration, focusing on a low-dimensional parameter space facilitates
clarity of prediction. Nevertheless, departures from the above assumptions are briefly
discussed in §4, where we consider the effects of different values of the other three param-
eters from the values assumed here (specifically, in §4 we consider finite λ and positive ρ
and k).
In general, what we wish to know is the strategy mix to which the population ulti-
mately evolves, which now depends only on α and θ as noted above. Thus, for any point
(α, θ) inside the parameter square
S = {(α, θ)|0 ≤ α, θ ≤ 1} (13)
in Figure 1 we wish to know the point or set of points in the phase-plane triangle
∆ = {(x1, x2)|0 ≤ x1 + x2 ≤ 1} (14)
in Figure 2 to which the vector (x1(t), x2(t)) of proportions of C- and D- strategists ulti-
mately evolves. This final destination is typically a static equilibrium point, in which case
we may denote it by (x1(∞), x2(∞)); but for a small subregion of S the final destination
is instead a dynamic equilibrium or limit cycle, as we shall see in due course.
Equations (9)–(12) and (B.1)–(B.3) imply that the evolution of (x1(t), x2(t)) towards its












(1− θ)x23 − (1− x1)
{


















α(1− x2)(1 + x12)− x1{x1(1 + x2) + 2x22}
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{α(1− x2)(1 + x1)− x1(1 + x2)}ωN − αθK(x1, x2, ωL)






























































(b) Interior equilibrium ( = 0,  →∞, k = 0)
Figure 1: The parameter square S.
(a) Regions corresponding to equilibria on the boundary of ∆. The curve from (1
2
, 1) to (1
2
, 0) between
regions ii and iii has equation 4θ2α3 + 12θ(1− θ)α2 + (11θ2 − 20θ + 8)α = 4(1− θ)2. The curve from (0, 1)
to (1
2





, 0) between regions iv ∪ v and iii ∪ vi has equation θ = (1 − 3α)/{2(1 − α)2 − 1}. These curves cross





5) ≈ 0.382 and θc = 12 (
√
5 − 1) ≈ 0.618. The dots at (α, θ) = (0.38, 0.7)
and (0.42, 0.7) correspond to Figure 2; the dashed curve joining (0, 1) to 2(
√
5− 2), 0) ≈ (0.472, 0) and other
details are discussed in Appendix D. The following table excludes a saddle point at (0, 0) and an unstable
node at (0, 1), both of which always exist.
i Unstable nodes at (1, 0) and saddle points at (0, x2s) and (x1r , x2r), where x1r + x2r = 1
ii Saddle points at (1, 0) and (0, x2s)
iii A stable node at (x+
1b
, 0) and saddle points at (x−
1b
, 0), (0, x2s) and (1, 0)
iv A stable node at (1, 0) and saddle points at (x+
1b
, 0) and (0, x2s)
v A stable node at (1, 0)
vi A stable node at (x+
1b
, 0)




) to (α2, 1) where α1 =
√
2 − 1 ≈ 0.414 and α2 ≈ 0.628. The dots at (α, θ) = (0.6, 0.6),
(0.43, 0.49) and (0.5, 0.8) correspond to Figures 3 and 4. For further details see Appendix D.
Ia A stable node at (p∗, p∗)
Ib An unstable node at (p∗, p∗)
IIa A stable focus at (p∗, p∗)
IIb An unstable focus at (p∗, p∗)



















































(b) α = 0.42, θ = 0.7, ρ = 0, λ → ∞, k = 0
Figure 2: Phase-plane triangles ∆ corresponding to two different points in regions iii and iv of Figure
1(a). Large dots denote equilibrium points, small dots denote points at which sample trajectories begin.
(a) This phase-plane triangle corresponds to the dot in region iv of Figure 1(a). There are 6 equilibrium
points: saddle points at (0, 0), (0, 0.1473) and (0.1212, 0), an unstable node at (0, 1), an unstable focus at
(0.0644, 0.0644) and a stable node at (1, 0). The vertex (1, 0) is the only local attractor and therefore also
the global attractor: the population evolves to a monomorphism of C. Three sample trajectories are shown,
with initial points (0.01, 0.8), (0.01, 0.5) and (0.08, 0.03). (b) This phase-plane triangle corresponds to the dot
in region iii of Figure 1(a). There are now 7 equilibrium points: saddle points at (0, 0), (0, 0.2659) (0.3779, 0)
and (1, 0), an unstable node at (0, 1), an unstable focus at (0.1312, 0.1312) and a stable node at (0.8005, 0).
This base-edge equilibrium is the only local attractor and therefore also the global attractor: the population
evolves to a polymorphism of C and U . Three sample trajectories are shown again; two initial points are
the same, the third has been changed from (0.225, 0.0875) to (0.01, 0.8). Separatrices are shown dashed. In
both cases, a separatrix joins the unstable focus to a base-edge saddle point and the side-edge saddle point
to the global attractor, although in (a) this separatrix is scarcely visible behind one of the trajectories.
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where we have defined
K(p, q, ω) = p2 + 1
2
(1 + p)(1− p− q + ωq) (16c)
for any size probability ω and proportions p, q. In view of (1), the right-hand sides of
(15) depend only on the proportions x1, x2 of strategies C,D and on the two dimension-
less parameters α and θ. The evolution of (x1(t), x2(t)) over the triangle ∆ can now be
determined from (16) by standard methods of nonlinear analysis (e.g., Strogatz, 2014;
Layek, 2015), with the proportion of strategy U simultaneously determined from (11) as
x3(t) = 1− x1(t)− x2(t).
We begin by noting that size advantage, although decisive, would have no effect in the
complete absence of U-strategists because in that case all contests would occur between
equals. Rather, C would go to fixation when its fitness exceeded that of a D-strategist by
twice or more, thus completely offsetting the 50% chance of losing a contest, that is, when
α < 1
2
; whereas both strategies would persist when 1
2
< α < 1, with the proportion of D in
the strategy mix increasing from 0 to 1
2
as α increased from 1
2
to 1. This intuition is readily
confirmed by analysis; see Appendix C, where an explicit expression is given for the
proportions of C and D when both persist. However, this no-U equilibrium, which occurs
on the “roof-edge”of ∆ where x1 + x2 = 1, fails to persist as soon as a single U-strategist
enters the population: in ∆ it is an unstable saddle point, which can be approached only
along the line where x3 = 0. (This saddle point does not appear in Figure 2 because the
phase plane is sketched for α < 1
2




We now proceed with a summary of the more general analysis, whose details are pre-
sented in appendices. Inspection of (16) reveals that all three vertices of ∆ are invariably
equilibrium points because φ1(1, 0) = φ2(0, 1) = 0; however, (0, 0) and (0, 1) are both un-
stable, (0, 0) being a saddle point and (0, 1) an unstable node (Appendix D). By contrast,
the type of (1, 0) depends on where (α, θ) lies in S: from Appendix D, it is an unstable
node, a saddle point or a stable node according to whether (α, θ) lies in region i, region
ii ∪ iii ∪ vi or region iv ∪ v of Figure 1(a). These points are illustrated by Figure 2, where
(1, 0) is a stable node in (a) but a saddle point in (b), whereas (0, 0) is a saddle point and
(0, 1) is an unstable focus in both panels.
Depending on the values of α and θ, up to four additional types of equilibrium may
also arise. We have already alluded to the possibility of a roof-edge equilibrium, denoted
by (x1r, x2r) and satisfying 0 < x1r < 1, 0 < x2r < 1, x1r + x2r = 1; it exists whenever (α, θ)
lies in region i of Figure 1(a), but it is always an unstable saddle point (Appendix D). From
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(b) α = 0.43, θ = 0.49, ρ = 0, λ → ∞, k = 0
Figure 3: Phase-plane triangles ∆ corresponding to two different points in region IIa of Figure 2(b). Large
dots denote equilibrium points, small dots denote points at which sample trajectories begin. (a) This phase-
plane triangle corresponds to the dot in region IIa∩ iii of 2(b), where an overbar denotes a set complement.
There are six equilibrium points: saddle points at (0, 0), (0, 0.4858) and (0.8417, 0.1583), unstable nodes
at (1, 0) and (0, 1) and a stable focus at (0.2869, 0.2869). Three sample trajectories are shown, with ini-
tial points (0.01, 0.8), (0.95, 0.03) and (0.225, 0.0875). Separatrices join the saddle points at (0, 0.4858) and
(0.8417, 0.1583) to the stable focus at (0.2869, 0.2869). Because this focus is the only local attractor, it is also
the global attractor: the population evolves to a polymorphism of all three strategies. (b) This phase-plane
triangle corresponds to the dot in region IIa ∩ iii of 2(b). There are seven equilibrium points: saddle points
at (0, 0), (0, 0.07099) (0.1084, 0) and (1, 0), an unstable node at (0, 1), a stable focus at (0.03994, 0.03994) and
a stable node at (0.5715, 0). Five sample trajectories are shown, with initial points (0.01, 0.8), (0.01, 0.5),
(0.25, 0.5), (0.065, 0.02) and (0.08, 0.03). To avoid clutter, no arrows were placed on the last two trajectories,
which converge to the stable focus and the stable node, respectively. A separatrix, shown dashed, joins the
unstable node at (0, 1) to the saddle point at (0.1084, 0). Because there are now two local attractors, there
is no longer a global attractor; rather, (x1(t), x2(t) converges to (0.03994, 0.03994) from points on the left of
the separatrix and to (0.5715, 0) from points on the right of it. That is, the population evolves to a polymor-
phism of all three strategies or a monomorphism of C, according to whether (x1(0), x2(0) lies on the left or
the right of the separatrix.
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will arise when (α, θ) lies in region iii ∪ iv ∪ vi of Figure 1(a). Region iv corresponds to a
base-edge saddle point; region vi corresponds to a base-edge stable node; and region iii
corresponds to two base-edge equilibria, a saddle point and a stable node. Again from
Appendix D, a “side-edge” equilibrium of the form (0, x2s) with 0 < x2s < 1 arises when
(α, θ) lies in region i∪ ii∪ iii∪ iv of Figure 1(a) or, equivalently, region I∪ II of Figure 1(b);
but it is always an unstable saddle point. Finally, for all (α, θ) in the very same region of
S, an interior equilibrium invariably arises on the 45◦ open line segment
Λ = {(x1, x2)|0 < x1 = x2 < 12} (17)




) in ∆. It is always either a node or a focus; but it is an attractor only
for (α, θ) ∈ Ia ∪ IIa. For (α, θ) ∈ Ib∪ IIb∩ iii ∪ iv there is a local attractor on the boundary
of ∆, which is also the global attractor; but for (α, θ) ∈ Ib ∪ IIb ∩ iii ∪ iv in Figure 1(b),
no static local attractor exists. In this region, (x1(t), x2(t) converges to a limit cycle, as
illustrated by Figure 4.
The result is that a unique global attractor exists for all (α, θ) ∈ S except points lying
in the narrow transitional region C in Figure 5. In this region, strategy D persists only if
the initial proportion of strategy C is very low (so that (x1(0), x2(0)) lies to the left of the
separatrix discussed in Appendix D). For all (α, θ) in region D ∪ E of Figure 5, however,
strategy D is guaranteed to persist at some level, either as part of a static polymorphism
(region D) or as part of a periodic dynamic equilibrium or limit cycle that surrounds an
unstable equilibrium (region E). Because p∗ is the average value of x1(t) or x2(t) over the
period of any such limit cycle, p∗ is a suitable measure of the representation of strategy
D (or C) within a polymorphism of all three strategies, regardless of whether strategy D
persists statically or a dynamically. We therefore refer to p∗ as the “strength” of strategy
D in such a polymorphism.
Within region E, the further (α, θ) moves away from the boundary with region D and
into the region where the equilibrium at (p∗, p∗) is unstable, the greater the amplitude of
the limit cycle; thus its amplitude increases with θ and decreases with α. The nearer (α, θ)
moves to the boundary with region B, the more the limit cycle approaches the side edge of
∆ where x1 = 0. So it is possible that a stochastic perturbation to strategy C could drive
it to extinction, but only at a point where the proportion of strategy D in the dynamic
polymorphism is high. Then (x1(t), x2(t) would move along x1 = 0 towards the saddle
point at (0, x2s); this is the only circumstance in which this equilibrium would become an
attractor. However, a single C mutant would shift (x1(t), x2(t) back onto the limit cycle.
So strategy D persists at strength p∗ for any (α, θ) in region D ∪ E, regardless of whether





















































(b) α = 0.5, θ = 0.8, ρ = 0, λ → ∞, k = 5.×10-7
Figure 4: Examples of persistence of strategy D in a limit cycle. The phase-plane triangle ∆ is shown for
α = 0.5, θ = 0.8, ρ = 0, λ → ∞ and two values of k; as in Figures 2 and 3, large dots denote equilibrium
points, small dots denote points at which sample trajectories begin. In both cases, there are five equilibrium
points: saddle points at (0, 0) and (0, x2s), an unstable node at (0, 1), an unstable focus at (p∗, p∗) and a non-
hyperbolic saddle-node equilibrium at (1, 0), as discussed in Appendix D. The closed curve is a limit cycle
surrounding the unstable focus at (p∗, p∗). Two sample trajectories of approach are shown, one starting
inside the limit cycle and one starting outside it; for simplicity of illustration, they are not sketched all the
way to convergence. Also shown dashed is the separatrix from the saddle point at (0, x2s) towards the
limit cycle. (a) Here k → 0. This phase-plane triangle ∆ corresponds to the point (α, θ) = (0.5, 0.8) in
region IIb ∩ iii ∩ iv of Figure 2(b); x2s = 0.5 and p∗ ≈ 0.2445. (b) Here k = 5 × 10−7; x2s ≈ 0.4698 and
p∗ ≈ 0.2303. In both cases, the limit cycle is a global attractor from inside ∆: the population evolves to a















































Figure 5: Strategy mix to which the population evolves as a function of α and θ for ρ = 0, λ → ∞ and k = 0.
For points (α, θ) in region A, (x1(t), x2(t)) is attracted to the vertex (1, 0) in the bottom right-hand corner
of the phase triangle ∆, so the population evolves to a monomorphism of strategy C. For points in region
B, (x1(t), x2(t)) is attracted to the base-edge of ∆: (x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (x+1b, 0) where x+1b is defined by (D.10),
a polymorphism of strategies C and U . Only for points (α, θ) in regions D or E is strategy D guaranteed
to persist. For (α, θ) in region D, (x1(t), x2(t)) is attracted to a stable node or focus; whereas for (α, θ) in
region E, the population evolves to a limit cycle instead. In either case, the population evolves to a (static or
dynamic) polymorphism of all three strategies. In the narrow transitional region C, the population evolves
either to a static polymorphism of all three strategies or to (x+
1b
, 0), according to whether (x1(0), x2(0)) lies
to the left or the right of a separatrix joining the unstable node at (0, 1) to the saddle point at (x−
1b
, 0). The
dots in regions A, B, C and E indicate the points for which the phase trajectories are plotted in Figures 2(a),
2(b), 3(b), and 4(a), respectively; in region D, the upper dot corresponds to Figure 3(a) and the lower dot
to Figure 6(a). The points (α∗, θ∗) ≈ (0.4302, 0.691) and (αw, θw) ≈ (0.4322, 0.6168) are, respectively, the
point at which the boundary between regions B and E has a vertical tangent and the lowest point of the
wedge-shaped region E; α∗ is not marked on the horizontal axis because it is too close to αw. See Appendix
D for further details.
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within region D ∪ E, the least value of α is {
√
1− θ − 1 + θ}/θ; as α increases from that
value to 1, the strength of strategy D increases from 0 to 1
2
.
How likely is such a limit cycle to arise in practice? There are currently no empirical
data to address this question. Nevertheless, from inspection of Figure 5, we can posit
that a necessary condition for the existence of such a limit cycle is that α∗ < α < α2 and
θw < θ < 1, or 0.432 < α < 0.628 and 0.617 < θ < 1 approximately.
We conclude this section by noting that the proportion of large individuals in a poly-
morphic population is always higher than the strength of strategy D because a U-strategist
is large with probability ωL. Let PL and PN denote the proportions of individuals in the
population who are large and normal, respectively. Then
PL = x2 + ωLx3, PN = x1 + ωNx3 (18)
where ωL and ωN are defined by (1), x3 is determined by (11) and PL + PN = 1. Thus, for
example, at the static polymorphism in Figure 3(a) where D persists at strength p∗ ≈ 0.287,
the proportion of individuals in the population who are large is p∗ + ωL(1− 2p∗) ≈ 0.489.
An important point for future empirical investigations is that an ESS may not itself be
directly observable (Mesterton-Gibbons, 2019, p. 360); and in this context, PL and PN are
observable, whereas p∗ is not.
4. Implications of owner advantage and other departures from the reduced model
In this section we relax some of the assumptions of the previous section by discussing
the effects of owner advantage (ρ 6= 0) and of reduced parasitoid density (a < ∞ or k > 0)
or size advantage (λ < ∞). Our results were obtained largely from numerical exploration
of the larger five-dimensional parameter space, although some analysis was possible. De-
tails appear in Appendix E. Here we confine ourselves to a brief summary, especially for
k and λ, so that we can focus on the more important implications of increasing ρ.
The effects of reducing parasitoid density and of reducing size advantage are similar.
In essence, for sufficiently large α, strategy D will persist at reduced parasitoid density
as long as k does not depart too greatly from its very small value in the reduced model,
when ρ and λ are unchanged; and again for sufficiently large α, strategy D will persist at
reduced size advantage as long as λ does not depart too greatly from its very large value
in the reduced model, when ρ and k are unchanged. Both of these results are strongly
intuitive: size advantage in contests is less likely to be favoured if a contest is less likely
in the first place, or if it is less than certain to be decisive when a contest does arise. Either
increasing k or decreasing λ from its reduced-model value reduces the strength of strategy
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D in the polymorphism that allows it to persist, and causes the interior equilibrium (p∗, p∗)
to drift down Λ towards the origin, where it eventually disappears (along with strategy
D). Significantly, however, in the absence of owner advantage (ρ = 0), whenever an
interior equilibrium exists, it always lies in Λ.
By contrast, as soon as owner advantage enters the picture (ρ 6= 0), the interior equilib-
rium veers off Λ towards the side edge of ∆, so we must now instead denote it by (p∗, q∗),
where p∗ < q∗. The effect is illustrated by Figure 6. The first panel shows a reduced-
model phase triangle for (α, θ) in region D with a lower value of θ than in Figure 3(a),
so that the global attractor is a stable node as opposed to a stable focus. Both strategy C
and strategy D have strength p∗ ≈ 0.113 in the corresponding polymorphism of all three
strategies. Steadily increasing the value of ρ from zero increases the strength of D in the
polymorphism, but decreases that of both C and U . The second panel shows the phase
plane at ρ = 0.2. The stable node has veered off Λ to (p∗, q∗) ≈ (0.0766, 0.211); and so the
strength of D has increased by almost 0.1, while that of C and that of U have decreased by
almost 0.04 and over 0.06, respectively. As ρ continues to increase, (p∗, q∗) moves steadily
towards the side-edge saddle point, which it absorbs at (p∗, q∗) ≈ (0, 0.279) for ρ ≈ 0.523.
For this and any higher value of ρ, the global attractor is a side-edge stable node, as illus-
trated by the third panel of Figure 6 (and the fourth panel is essentially unrelated to the
present discussion, being included to illustrate a point about the effect of k in Appendix
E). Strategy C has now been eliminated from the polymorphism, but D persists alongside
U , whose strength is lower than for ρ = 0 (although still much higher than that of D).
Figure 6 illustrates that owner advantage reinforces the effect of size advantage to
increase the strength of strategy D in a polymorphism where D would have persisted for
ρ = 0, because (α, θ) lies in region D of Figure 5. However, a more interesting question is
whether owner advantage can enable D to persist in region A of Figure 5, where D would
not persist for ρ = 0. The answer is yes. What happens in this case is that increasing
ρ induces the globally attracting stable node at (1, 0) to migrate leftward along x2 = 0
toward the origin, and then upward along the side edge. This effect is illustrated by
Figure 7 for α = 0.25 and θ = 0.5, so that (α, θ) lies in region A of Figure 5. In this case,
(x1(t), x2(t)) transitions away from (1, 0) and through the origin at ρ ≈ 0.25 and ρ ≈ 0.467,
respectively.
To appreciate how significantly owner advantage changes the overall picture, we need
only remember that in its absence a global attractor on the side edge of ∆ is impossible.
For ρ = 0, no (α, θ) in region v∪vi of Figure 1 ever corresponds to a side-edge equilibrium;
and when a side-edge equilibrium does exist, it is always an unstable saddle point. By





































































































d) α = 0.5, θ = 0.3, ρ = 0.2, λ → ∞, k = 0.01
Figure 6: Phase-plane triangles ∆ corresponding to the lower point marked in region D of Figure 5 for
different values of ρ. The line segment Λ defined by (17) is shown dashed; as in Figures 2–4, large dots
denote equilibrium points, small dots denote points at which sample trajectories begin. In addition to the
three vertex equilibria, there is a side-edge equilibrium in each example, a roof-edge saddle point in in each
example except (a), and an interior equilibrium in in each example except (c). In (a), (b) and (d), the interior
equilibrium is a globally attracting stable node; in (c), the global attractor has migrated to the side-edge; and
in (a), (b) and (d), the side-edge equilibrium is a saddle point. See §4 and Appendix E for further details.
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to a side-edge equilibrium, but also to a global attractor if ρ is sufficiently large. In Figure
8, we have set θ = 1
2
(equal numbers of natural and more deadly hosts) to match Figure 7
and we have replaced S by the new parameter square
S̃ = {(α, ρ)|0 ≤ α, ρ ≤ 1} (19)
to better illustrate the effect of varying α and ρ while holding θ fixed; if we think of S in
Figure 5 as the horizontal base of a cube with ρ increasing vertically, then S̃ corresponds
to a vertical cross section through the centre of this cube in the plane where θ = 1
2
.
A very small value of α may require a very large value of ρ to ensure the persistence of
strategy D, and Figure 8 demonstrates its persistence for only a single value of θ. Never-
theless, it is shown in Appendix E that ρ can always be made sufficiently large to ensure
that D persists, although if α is small, D may persist only if ρ is close to 1, and only at very
low strength. However, the strength of D is less important than the proportion of large
individuals, who may be either D-strategists or U-strategists; and although, for example,
the strength of D at the global attractor in Figure 7(c) is only q∗ ≈ 0.0729, from (18) the
proportion of large individuals in this polymorphism is q∗ + ωL(1− q∗) ≈ 0.258.
5. Discussion
Advancement of our understanding of animal contests has been possible through a
successful combination of well-integrated theoretical and experimental approaches (Briffa
& Hardy, 2013; Kokko, 2013; Sherratt & Mesterton-Gibbons, 2013). Game-theory is not
only useful to predict how general strategies evolve in order to maximize fitness, but it is
has been proven to be flexible enough to adapt towards the specific biological features of
a given species of interest (Hammerstein & Riechert, 1988). To date, limited attention has
been given to the role played by anthropogenic disturbances, yet these are increasingly
frequent components of the environment of free-living organisms as a result of globaliza-
tion, leading to accidental introductions, and climate change affecting species’ geograph-
ical ranges (Mooney & Hobbs, 2000).
We have used evolutionary game theory (Broom & Rychtář, 2013; Mesterton-Gibbons,
2019; Sigmund, 2010) to address the following question: can size advantage in contests
among parasitoid wasps sustain a preference for a more deadly host? The question is
currently a theoretical one because relevant empirical observations are so preliminary,
and hence we have used a low-dimensional parameter space for clarity of prediction:
our answer depends on only two dimensionless parameters, namely, the ratio (α) of the





































































































(d) α = 0.25, θ = 0.5, ρ = 0.8, λ → ∞, k = 0
Figure 7: Phase-plane triangles ∆ corresponding to a point in region A of Figure 5 for different values of
ρ. As in Figures 2–4 and 6, large dots denote equilibrium points, small dots denote points at which sample
trajectories begin. In addition to the three vertex equilibria, there is a base-edge stable node in (b), and
there are both a roof-edge saddle point and a side-edge stable node in both (c) and (d). As ρ increases, the
globally attracting stable node migrates leftward along x2 = 0 toward the origin, and then upward along





















Figure 8: Strategy mix to which the population evolves as a function of α and ρ for θ = 1
2
, λ → ∞ and
k = 0. For points (α, ρ) in region 1 of S̃ (defined by (19)), (x1(t), x2(t)) is attracted to vertex (1, 0) ∈ ∆ as
t → ∞, so the population evolves to a monomorphism of strategy C. For points in unshaded region 2,
(x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (x+1b, 0) on the base edge of ∆, so the population evolves to a polymorphism of strate-
gies C and U . Only for points (α, ρ) in region 3 or region 4 and outside transitional region 5 is strategy
D guaranteed to persist, within a polymorphism of either D and U or all three strategies, as indicated.
For points in region 3, (x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (0, x2s) on the side edge of ∆, except in the intersection of re-
gions 3 and 5, where (x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (0, x2s) only if (x1(0), x2(0)) is very close to (0, x2s), and otherwise
(x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (x+1b, 0) as in the rest of region 3. For points in region 4, (x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (p∗, q∗) in
the interior of ∆, except in the intersection of regions 4 and 5, where (x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (p∗, q∗) only if
(x1(0), x2(0)) is very close to (p∗, q∗), and otherwise (x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (x+1b, 0) as in the rest of region 5.
The larger dots at (0.25, 0.2), (0.25, 0.4), (0.25, 0.6) and (0.25, 0.8) correspond to panels (a), (b), (c) and (d),
respectively, in Figure 7. Note that moving along the base of the above square from left to right corresponds
to moving in the same direction along the central axis θ = 1
2
of the square in Figure 5. For all other details,
including the purpose of the smaller dots in region 5, see Appendix G.
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of all hosts that are of the more deadly variety. And because the left-hand boundary of
region E in Figure 5 has its vertical tangent at (α∗, θ∗), where α∗ ≈ 0.4302 and θ∗ ≈ 0.691,
our analysis predicts that the answer is yes, but that D can persist only if the value of a
more deadly host is at least 43% of the value of a natural one (though, on the other hand,
strategy D is also guaranteed to exist, even at low proportions of the more deadly host, if
the relative value is 50% or greater, because (α, θ) ∈ D ∪ E in Figure 5 for all α ≥ 1
2
).
The two-parameter model we have analysed in §3 is a special case of the more general
five-parameter model that we formulated in §2 (and Appendix A), obtained in the limit
of no owner advantage, extreme size advantage and high parasitoid density, that is, for
ρ = 0, λ → ∞ and k = 0. In principle, we could repeat our analysis for any other
set of values of the other three parameters, that is, for ρ > 0, finite λ and k > 0, and
for each such choice we could in principle obtain analogues of Figures 1–5. In practice,
however, such an investment of current effort would be unwise, because in the absence
of empirical data, no such values have any greater significance than the limiting values
we have already chosen.
Nevertheless, we have explored the more general five-dimensional parameter space
numerically, as described in §4, and in particular have investigated how owner advan-
tage can reinforce the advantage of size. Our analysis not only shows that a preference
for the more deadly host is most favoured when the asymmetries of size and ownership
both apply, but it also predicts that an obligate preference for the natural host cannot be
eliminated unless both asymmetries operate. This result is implicit in Figures 6 and 7
but is further clarified by the analytical results presented in Appendix F. Because owner
advantage significantly reduces the value of α at which a preference for the more deadly
host can persist, it seems that size advantage in contests is unlikely by itself to sustain
a preference for Halyomorpha hyalis among Trissolcus basalis, but that such a preference
could be maintained by the simultaneous operation of both size advantage and owner-
ship advantage (as is observed in some parasitoids, Hardy et al., 2013). However, the issue
remains very much an open question because empirical studies are at such a preliminary
stage, even though some aspects of patch defence and contest behaviour in T. basalis have
been previously investigated with regard to its role as a parasitoid of the pentatomid bug
Agonoscelis rutila (Fabricious) (Field & Calbert, 1998; Field, 1998; Field et al., 1998; Field
& Calbert, 1999). Although asymmetries in wasps’ contestant abilities were not explored,
this work indicates that the main factor influencing contest outcome is prior ownership,
closely fitting the Bourgeois strategy that was explored by classic game-theoretic models
during the early development of general theory for contests: i.e., females that arrive first
on the patch almost always win against subsequent intruders (Field et al., 1998).
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The oviposition into invasive hosts by indigenous parasitoids would be expected to
select for an enhanced ability to survive development in those hosts and thus an evo-
lutionary change in α, the relative reproductive value of the unnatural host (Berthon,
2015). Hence, it is possible that the contest biology of T. basalis will act to promote a more
stable association with the Brown Marmorated Stink Bug, ultimately facilitating escape
from what has been seen as the evolutionary trap of accepting hosts that are unsuitable
for the development of its offspring (Schlaepfer et al., 2002, 2005; Abram et al., 2014).
The invasive Brown Marmorated Stink Bug is a major agricultural pest in Europe and in
north America where the biological control provided by resident egg parasitoids such as
T. basalis is generally considered insufficient to reduce the pest population density below
economical thresholds (Rice et al., 2014; Leskey & Nielsen, 2018). An enhanced ability
of resident natural enemies to survive development in this pest may indicate that, over
generations, the value of native egg parasitoids in biological control could increase.
6. References
Abram, P. K., Gariepy, T. D., Boivin, G., & Brodeur, J. (2014). An invasive stink bug as an
evolutionary trap for an indigenous egg parasitoid. Biological Invasions, 16, 1387–1395.
Abram, P. K., Hoelmer, K. A., Acebes-Doria, A., Andrews, H., Beers, E. H., Bergh, J. C.,
Bessin, R., Biddinger, D., Botch, P., Buffington, M. L., Cornelius, M. L., Costi, E.,
Delfosse, E. S., Dieckhoff, C., Dobson, R., Donais, Z., Grieshop, M., Hamilton, G., Haye,
T., Hedstrom, C., Herlihy, M. V., Hoddle, M. S., Hooks, C. R. R., Jentsch, P., Joshi, N. K.,
Kuhar, T. P., Lara, J., Lee, J. C., Legrand, A., Leskey, T. C., Lowenstein, D., Maistrello, L.,
Mathews, C. R., Milnes, J. M., Morrison III, W. R., Nielsen, A. L., Ogburn, E. C., Pickett,
C. H., Poley, K., Pote, J., Radl, J., Shrewsbury, P. M., Talamas, E., Tavella, L., Walgenbach,
J. F., Waterworth, R., Weber, D. C., Welty, C., & Wiman, N. G. (2017). Indigenous arthro-
pod natural enemies of the invasive brown marmorated stink bug in North America
and Europe. Journal of Pest Science, 90, 1009–1020. doi:10.1007/s10340-017-0891-7.
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Appendix A. Fitness calculation
We begin by computing a focal C-strategist’s expected number of offspring from a
suitable host, conditional on discovery at time T ; for a C-strategist, suitable host means
24
natural host. We denote this conditional payoff by w1(T ). With probability Z(T ), the host
has already been discovered by another individual. With probability x1, the first discov-
erer is another C-strategist. In that case, there ensues a contest between equals, which the
intruding C-strategist wins with probability qI , defined by (3). With probability x2, the
first discoverer is a D-strategist, and so the host is unguarded. With probability x3, the
first discoverer is a U-strategist. It has larger size if it emerged from a more deadly host,
which happens with probability ωL, defined by (1), and then the intruding C-strategist
wins with only the reduced probability qIN , defined by (4); whereas if the first discoverer
emerged from a natural host, which happens with probability ωN , then its probability of
victory is qI , the same as for a C-strategist.
From above, the probability that the host is guarded at time T is Z(T ) · (x1 + x3). The
host is unguarded if either the first discoverer is a D-strategist or the host has not been
discovered by time T , that is, with probability Z(T ) · x2 + 1− Z(T ). In that case, the focal
C-strategist becomes the owner. With (conditional) probability 1 − Y (T ), the host is not
subsequently discovered, the protagonist remains the owner, and its payoff is therefore
1 (unit of fitness). With probability Y (T ), however, the C-strategist is subsequently in-
truded upon. Conditional thereon, with probability x2 the intruder is a D-strategist and
the focal C-strategist remains the owner, because the host is a natural one. But a contest
ensues if the intruder is either a C- or a U-strategist. The focal C-strategist wins this con-
test with probability qO if the intruder is normal, which happens if the intruder is a C
strategist or with probability ωN if the intruder is a U-strategist, and with probability qON
if the intruder is large, which happens with probility ωL if the intruder is a U-strategist.
Thus the payoff from a host located at time T is
w1(T ) = Z(T ) ·
{
x1 · qI + x3(ωL · qIN + ωN · qI)
}
+
{Z(T ) · x2 + 1− Z(T )} ·
{
{1− Y (T )} · 1 +




w1(T ) = k + {x1 · qI + x3(ωL · qIN + ωN · qI)}Z(T ) + x2Z(T ){1− Y (T )} +
+ {x1 · qO + x2 + x3(ωL · qON + ωN · qO)}
{
x2Z(T )Y (T ) + {1− Z(T )}Y (T )
}
(A.2)
on using (6). But T is a random variable, and so we compute the expected value of w1(T )
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over the distribution of T to obtain the fitness W1 to a C-strategist:
W1 = E [w1(T )]
= k + {x1 · qI + x3(ωL · qIN + ωN · qI)}E [Z(T )] + x2 E [Z(T ){1− Y (T )}] +
{x1 · qO + x2 + x3(ωL · qON + ωN · qO)}
{
x2E [Z(T )Y (T )] + E [{1− Z(T )}Y (T )]
}
(A.3)
from (7), where E denotes expected value. But from (8) we obtain
E [Z(T )] = 1− γ
















Z(t){1− Y (t} dt = k − 1
ln(k)
− k = γ − k






Y (t){1− Z(t} dt = k − 1
ln(k)
− k = γ − k






Z(t) Y (t) dt = 1 + k +
2(1− k)
ln(k)
= 1− 2γ + k.
(A.4)
Note that 0 < k < 1 ensures 0 < k < γ < 1
2
(1 + k) < 1 with
lim
k→0
γ = 0, lim
k→1
γ = 1 (A.5)
so that all expressions in (A.4) are positive. Substituting from (A.4) into (A.3), the fitness
to a C-strategist is given by
W1 = k + {x1 · qI + x3(ωL · qIN + ωN · qI)}(1− γ) + x2 (γ − k) +
{x1 · qO + x2 + x3(ωL · qON + ωN · qO)}
{




which is a function of the strategy proportions and five dimensionless parameters, namely,
α, θ, λ, ρ and k.
Next we compute a focal D-strategist’s expected number of offspring from a suitable
host, conditional on discovery at time T ; for a D-strategist, suitable host means a more
deadly host yielding fitness α. We denote this conditional payoff by w2(T ). With proba-
bility Z(T ), the host has already been discovered by another individual. With probability
x1, the first discoverer is a C-strategist, and so the host is unguarded. With probability
x2, the first discoverer is another D-strategist. In that case, there ensues a contest between
equals, which the intruding D-strategist wins with probability qI , defined by (3). With
probability x3, the first discoverer is a U-strategist. It is large if it emerged from a more
deadly host, which happens with probability ωL, defined by (1), and then the intruding
D-strategist again wins with probability qI ; whereas if the first discoverer emerged from
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a natural host, which happens with probability ωN , then the intruding D-strategist wins
with the larger probability qIL defined by (5).
From above, the probability that the host is guarded at time T is Z(T ) · (x2 + x3).
The host is unguarded if either the first discoverer is a C-strategist or the host has not
been discovered by time T , that is, with probability Z(T ) · x1 + 1 − Z(T ). In that case,
the focal D-strategist becomes the owner. With (conditional) probability 1 − Y (T ), the
host is not subsequently discovered, the protagonist remains the owner, and its payoff is
therefore α. With probability Y (T ), however, the D-strategist is subsequently intruded
upon. Conditional thereon, with probability x1 the intruder is a C-strategist and the focal
D-strategist remains the owner, because the host is not a natural one. But a contest ensues
if the intruder is either a D- or a U-strategist. The focal D-strategist wins this contest
with probability qO if the intruder is large, which happens if the intruder is a D strategist
or with probability ωL if the intruder is a U-strategist, and with probability qON if the
intruder is normal, which happens with probility ωN if the intruder is a U-strategist. Thus
the payoff from a host located at time T is
w2(T ) = Z(T ) ·
{
x2 · qI + x3(ωL · qI + ωN · qIL)
}
α +
{Z(T ) · x1 + 1− Z(T )} ·
{
{1− Y (T )} · 1 +






k + {x2 · qI + x3(ωL · qI + ωN · qIL)}Z(T ) + x1Z(T ){1− Y (T )} +
+ {x1 + x2 · qO + x3(ωL · qO + ωN · qOL)}
{




on using (6). But T is a random variable, and so we compute the expected value of w1(T )
over the distribution of T to obtain the fitness W2 to a D-strategist; on using (A.4), we
obtain
W2 = E [w2(T )]
=
(
k + {x2 · qI + x3(ωL · qI + ωN · qIL)}(1− γ) + x1(γ − k) +
+ {x1 + x2 · qO + x3(ωL · qO + ωN · qOL)}
{





which is again a function of the strategy proportions and five dimensionless parameters,
namely, α, θ, λ, ρ and k.
Lastly we compute a focal U-strategist’s expected number of offspring from a suitable
host, conditional on discovery at time T ; for a U-strategist, a suitable host means any host.
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We denote this conditional payoff by w3(T ). We first compute a focal U-strategist’s ex-
pected number of offspring from a more deadly host, calling this payoff w3L(T ); then we
compute a focal U-strategist’s expected number of offspring from a natural host, calling
this payoff w3N(T ). Then because more deadly and natural hosts are found in proportions
θ and 1− θ, respectively, we compute w3(T ) as
w3(T ) = θ w3L(T ) + (1− θ)w3N(T ). (A.10)
So we first assume that the suitable host is more deadly host. With probability Z(T ),
this host has already been discovered by another individual. With probability x1, the first
discoverer is a C-strategist, and so the host is unguarded. With probability x2, the first
discoverer is a D-strategist. In that case, there ensues a contest, which the intruding U-
strategist wins with probability qI if large and qIN if normal. With probability x3, the first
discoverer is a U-strategist, and the intruding U-strategist wins the ensuing contest with
probability ωL·qI+ωN ·qIN if the first discoverer is large but with probability ωL·qIL+ωN ·qI
if the first discoverer is normal; that is, the intruding U-strategist wins with probability
qA = ωL · (ωLqI + ωNqIN ) + ωN · (ωLqIL + ωNqI)
= qI{ωL2 + ωN 2}+ {qIL + qIN}ωLωN .
(A.11)
From above, the probability that the more deadly host is guarded at time T is Z(T ) ·
(x2 + x3). The host is unguarded if either the first discoverer is a C-strategist or the host
has not been discovered by time T , that is, with probability Z(T ) · x1 + 1 − Z(T ). In that
case, the focal U-strategist becomes the owner. With (conditional) probability 1 − Y (T ),
the host is not subsequently discovered, the protagonist remains the owner, and its payoff
is therefore α. With probability Y (T ), however, the U-strategist is subsequently intruded
upon. Conditional thereon, with probability x1 the intruder is a C-strategist and the focal
U-strategist remains the owner, because the host is not a natural one. But a contest ensues
if the intruder is either a D- or a U-strategist. If the intruder is a D-strategist, then the
focal U-strategist wins with probability qO if large and qON if normal, i.e., with probability
ωL · qO + ωN · qON . If the intruder is a U-strategist, then by analogy with (A.11), the focal
U-strategist wins the contest with probability
qB = ωL · (ωLqO + ωNqOL) + ωN · (ωLqON + ωNqO)
= qO{ωL2 + ωN 2}+ {qOL + qON}ωLωN .
(A.12)
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Thus the payoff from a more deadly host located at time T is
w3L(T ) = Z(T ) ·
{
x2 · (ωL · qI + ωN · qIN) + x3 · qA
}
α +
{Z(T ) · x1 + 1− Z(T )} ·
{
{1− Y (T )} · 1 +






k + {x2 · (ωL · qI + ωN · qIN) + x3 · qA}Z(T ) + x1Z(T ){1− Y (T )} +
+ {x1 + x2(ωLqO + ωNqON) + x3qB}
{





We now assume that the suitable host is a natural host. With probability Z(T ), this
host has already been discovered by another individual. With probability x1, the first
discoverer is a C-strategist. In that case, there ensues a contest, which the intruding U-
strategist wins with probability qIL if large and qI if normal, that is, with probability ωL ·
qIL + ωN · qI . With probability x2, the first discoverer is a D-strategist, and so the host
is unguarded. With probability x3, the first discoverer is another U-strategist, and the
intruding U-strategist wins the ensuing contest with probability ωL · qI + ωN · qIN if the
first discoverer is large but with probability ωL ·qIL+ωN ·qI if the first discoverer is normal;
that is, the intruding U-strategist wins with probability qA defined by (A.11).
From above, the probability that the natural host is guarded at time T is Z(T )·(x1+x3).
The host is unguarded if either the first discoverer is a D-strategist or the host has not
been discovered by time T , that is, with probability Z(T ) · x2 + 1 − Z(T ). Then the focal
U-strategist becomes the owner. With (conditional) probability 1 − Y (T ), the host is not
subsequently discovered, the protagonist remains the owner, and its payoff is therefore 1.
With probability Y (T ), however, the U-strategist is subsequently intruded upon. Condi-
tional thereon, with probability x2 the intruder is a D-strategist and the focal U-strategist
remains the owner, because the host is not a stink bug. But a contest ensues if the intruder
is either a C- or a U-strategist. If the intruder is a C-strategist, then the focal U-strategist
wins with probability qOL if large and qO if normal, i.e., with probability ωL · qOL+ωN · qO.
If the intruder is a U-strategist, then by analogy with (A.12), the focal U-strategist wins
the contest with probability qB. Thus the payoff from a natural host located at time T is
w3N(T ) = Z(T ) ·
{
x1 · (ωL · qIL + ωN · qI) + x3 · qA
}
+
{Z(T ) · x2 + 1− Z(T )} ·
{
{1− Y (T )} · 1 +







k + {x1 · (ωL · qIL + ωN · qI) + x3 · qA}Z(T ) + x2Z(T ){1− Y (T )} +
+ {x1(ωL · qOL + ωN · qO) + x2 + x3qB}
{




on using (6). Substitution from (A.14) and (A.16) into (A.10) now yields W3(T ). But T is
a random variable, and so we compute the expected value of w3(T ) over the distribution
of T to obtain the fitness W3 to a D-strategist; on using (A.4), we obtain
W3 = E [w3(T )] = θ E [w3L(T )] + (1− θ)E [w3N(T )]
= θ
(
k + {x2 · (ωL · qI + ωN · qIN) + x3 · qA}(1− γ) + x1(γ − k) +
{x1 + x2(ωLqO + ωNqON) + x3qB}
{






k + {x1 · (ωL · qIL + ωN · qI) + x3 · qA}(1− γ) + x2(γ − k) +
{x1(ωL · qOL + ωN · qO) + x2 + x3qB}
{




which is again a function of the strategy proportions and five dimensionless parameters,
namely, α, θ, λ, ρ and k.
Appendix B. Fitnesses in the limit as a → ∞
The expressions for the fitnesses simplify greatly in the limit as a → ∞ and hence
k → 0 in (7), so that also γ → 0 by (8). From (A.6), (A.9) and (A.17), we obtain
W1 = x1 · qI + x3(ωL · qIN + ωN · qI) + {x1 · qO + x2 + x3(ωL · qON + ωN · qO)}x2, (B.1)
W2 =
(






x2 · (ωL · qI + ωN · qIN) + x3 · qA +





x1 · (ωL · qIL + ωN · qI) + x3 · qA +































(1 + x2)(x3 + {1 + ωL}x1) + x22
)
(B.6)








Appendix C. The strategy mix without U -strategists for k → ∞, ρ = 0, λ → ∞
When x3 = 0, the third equation in (9) becomes an identity; the second becomes su-
perfluous, because x2 = 1−x1 by (11); and because W1−W = 1 ·W1−W = (x1+x2)W1−





x1x2{(1− x1)2 − α(1 + x12) + 1}. (C.1)
If α < 1
2
, then the term in squiggly brackets is strictly positive, implying x1 → 1, x2 → 0
as t → ∞. If 1
2
< α < 1, however, it becomes negative for 1
2
< x1r < x1 < 1, implying
x1 → x1r, x2 → x2r as t → ∞ where x1r = 1− x2r and
x2r =
√
α− (1− α)2 − α
1− α (C.2)
(which increases from 0 to 1
2
as α increases from 1
2
towards 1). We note in passing that
1
2
< x2r < 1 for 1 < α < 2 and H goes to fixation for α > 2 because the term in squiggly
brackets in (C.1) becomes strictly negative—in perfect accord with intuition, but also irrel-
evant, because α < 1 is an assumption of our analysis. The equilibrium (x1r, x2r) remains
an equilibrium when U is introduced to the strategy mix but is no longer an attractor: it
becomes an unstable saddle point on the “roof-edge” of ∆, as illustrated by Figure 3(b).
Appendix D. Phase-plane analysis for k = 0, ρ = 0, λ → ∞
The phase plane is analyzed by standard techniques of nonlinear analysis (e.g., Stro-
gatz, 2014; Layek, 2015). In particular, the equilibrium points are classified as described







= G2(x1, x2), (D.1)
that is if G1(x̃1, x̃2) = 0 = G2(x̃1, x̃2), then its type is determined by the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix J(x̃1, x̃2) having gij(x̃1, x̃2) = ∂Gi/∂xj |x1=x̃1,x2=x̃2 in row i and column
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j, and hence by the roots—termed r1(x̃1, x̃2) and r2(x̃1, x̃2)—of its characteristic equation
r2 − {g11(x̃1, x̃2) + g22(x̃1, x̃2)}r + g11(x̃1, x̃2)g22(x̃1, x̃2) − g12(x̃1, x̃2)g21(x̃1, x̃2) = 0. Those
roots are real whenever the discriminant
δCE(x̃1, x̃2) = (g11(x̃1, x̃2)− g22{x̃1, x̃2)}2 + 4g12(x̃1, x̃2)g21(x̃1, x̃2) (D.2)
of the characteristic equation is positive, and in particular when g12(x̃1, x̃2) and g21(x̃1, x̃2)
have the same sign (or at least one of them is zero, as at all three vertices of the phase
triangle ∆). The equilibrium is stable if both roots have a negative real part, and otherwise
it is unstable. For real roots, (x̃1, x̃2) is a stable node, an unstable node or a saddle point
according to whether the eigenvalues are both negative, both positive or have opposite
signs; and for complex conjugate roots, (x̃1, x̃2) is an unstable or stable focus, according
to whether the eigenvalues have a positive or negative real part. We note in passing that
these classification criteria do not apply to non-hyperbolic equilibrium points at which
the real part of an eigenvalue is zero, but they suffice for our purposes because we make
the generic payoffs assumption (Broom & Rychtář, 2013, p. 21; Mesterton-Gibbons, 2019,
p. 13), and non-hyperbolic equilibria are non-generic.
We now proceed with identifying all equilibria. It is clear from inspection of (15)
that (0, 0), (1, 0) and (0, 1) are all equilibrium points because φ1(1, 0) = φ2(0, 1) = 0. On
setting G1(x1, x2) = x1φ1(x1, x2) and G2(x1, x2) = x2φ2(x1, x2) in (D.1), we find that the
eigenvalues at (0, 0) are
r1(0, 0) = −
1
2
ωNσ0b(α, θ), r2(0, 0) =
1
2α
ωL σ0b(α, θ) (D.3)
where σ0b is defined by (D.8) below. Because they have opposite signs, (0, 0) is invariably




(2− α), r2(0, 1) = 12(1− θ){(1− α)ωL + (2− α)ωN}. (D.4)
Both are positive, hence (0, 1) is invariably an unstable node. The eigenvalues at (1, 0) are
r1(1, 0) = −12(1− 2α), r2(1, 0) = −
1
2α
ωL σ1b(α, θ). (D.5)
The first eigenvalue is negative for α < 1
2
and positive for α > 1
2
. The second eigenvalue
is negative to the left of the curve separating region iv ∪ v from region i ∪ ii ∪ iii ∪ vi in
Figure 1, and r2 > 0 to the right of this curve. Thus (1, 0) is a stable node when (α, θ) lies
in region iv ∪ v, a saddle point when (α, θ) lies in region ii ∪ iii ∪ vi and an unstable node
when (α, θ) lies in region i. We note in passing that (1, 0) is non-hyperbolic where σ1b = 0
or α = 1
2
; these points form a set of measure zero, and hence are non-generic. Such a non-
hyperbolic equilibrium is exemplified by (1, 0) in Figure 4, for which nonlinear terms in
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the Taylor expansion of (15) about this point can be used to classify it as a saddle-node
equilibrium (Layek, 2015); however, trajectories in its vicinity still resemble those near a
saddle point, as Figure 4 illustrates.
A “roof-edge” equilibrium (x1r, x2r) on the hypotenuse of ∆ has already been identi-
fied in Appendix C; it exists as long as 1
2
< α < 1, that is, when (α, θ) lies in region i of
Figure 1, as illustrated by Figure 3(b). Because r1(x1r, x2r) and r2(x1r, x2r) are the roots
of a quadratic equation, explicit expressions for them, their product r1(x1r, x2r)r2(x1r, x2r)
and the discriminant δCE(x1r, x2r) are easily determined. They are continuous functions
of α and θ, but they are too cumbersome for useful analysis. A much more efficient way
to determine their signs inside a region is to use constrained numerical optimization (e.g.,
Bertsekas, 2016; Aragón et al., 2019), for which powerful and reliable mathematical pack-
ages are now widely available. If a discriminant δCE(x̃1, x̃2) has a minimum of zero over
some region, then the associated eigenvalues must be real on that region. If, further, the
eigenvalue product r1(x̃1, x̃2)r2(x̃1, x̃2) has a maximum of 0 on the boundary of the re-
gion, then it must be negative inside the region, and so (x̃1, x̃2) must be a saddle point;
whereas if both the product r1(x̃1, x̃2)r2(x̃1, x̃2) has a minimum of zero on the boundary
and the sum r1(x̃1, x̃2)+ r2(x̃1, x̃2) has either a maximum of zero or a minimum of zero on
the boundary, then (x̃1, x̃2) must be either a stable or an unstable node, respectively. The
requisite properties can all be readily established by numerical optimization.
In the case of (x1r, x2r), over region i in Figure 1 we find that δCE(x1r, x2r) has a min-
imum of 0 at both (1
2
, 0) and (1
2
, 1); and that r1(x1r, x2r)r2(x1r, x2r) has a maximum of 0,
which occurs all the way around the boundary for θ = 0, α → 1, θ = 1 and α = 1
2
. For
all (α, θ) satisfying 1
2
< α < 1, 0 < θ < 1, therefore, r1(x1r, x2r)r2(x1r, x2r) < 0. Hence
(x1r, x2r) is invariably a saddle point, the boundary of region I being excluded by (2).
Let us now turn our attention to the possibility of equilibria on the base edge of ∆
where 0 < x1 < 1, x2 = 0 or on the side edge where x1 = 0, 0 < x2 < 1. From (15) we find
that
φ1(x1, 0) = (1− x1)Q1(x1), φ2(0, x2) = (1− x2)Q2(x2) (D.6)











(2− θ − ωL)α− (1− θ){1 + x22 + (1− ωL)αx2}
}
(D.7)
with ωL defined by (1). A base-edge equilibrium occurs where Q1(x1) = 0, and a side-edge
equilibrium occurs where Q2(x2) = 0. We deal with base-edge equilibria first.
In that regard, the signs of Q1(0) and Q1(1) are determined by σ0b and σ1b, respectively,
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where we define
σ0b(α, θ) = (1− θ)(1− 2α)− α2θ, σ1b(α, θ) = 2αθ(2− α)− 3α− θ + 1. (D.8)
The quadratic equation Q1(x1) = 0 has two real roots whenever the discriminant δ1b is
positive, where we define
δb(α, θ) = α
2θ4 + 4αθ2(1− θ + αθ)σ0b(α, θ). (D.9)
In Figure 1, σ0b is positive in region v ∪ vi and negative in region i ∪ ii ∪ iii ∪ iv, whereas
σ1b is positive in region iv ∪ v and negative in region i ∪ ii ∪ iii ∪ vi; and δb is positive in
region iii∪ iv∪ v∪ vi but negative in region i∪ ii. Thus, because Q1(x1) = 0 implies x1 < 0
or x1 > 1 if Q1(0) and Q1(1) are both positive and δb < 0 implies Q(x1) < 0 for all x1, no
point either in i∪ ii or in region v of Figure 1 corresponds to a base-edge equilibrium. Any
point in region iv ∪ vi corresponds to a unique base-edge equilibrium because Q1(0) and
Q1(1) have opposite signs: Q1(0) < 0, Q1(1) > 0 in region iv, whereas Q1(0) > 0, Q1(1) < 0
in region vi. In region iii, however, there are always two base-edge equilibria because the
whole of region iii lies below the curve from 1
2
, 1) to (0, 2
3
) with equation θ = 2/{3 − 2α}
(not shown in Figure 1), implying that ωL < 2α and hence that ∂Q1/∂x2|x2=0 = 12θωL > 0
and ∂Q1/∂x2|x2=1 = 12θ(ωL−2α) < 0 have opposite signs, and so the positive maximum of
Q1 must occur within (0, 1). The dot indicates such a point in region iii, corresponding to
two base-edge equilibria. Here α = 0.42 and θ = 0.7, implying σ0b(α, θ) = −0.7548× 10−1,
σ1b(α, θ) = −0.3096×10−1 and δb(α, θ) = 0.5445×10−2. The corresponding equilibria are a
saddle point at (0.3779, 0) and a globally attracting stable node at (0.8005, 0), as illustrated
by Figure 2(b).




4α(1− α− ωL/θ) + ω2L
2α
(D.10)
by (D.7), where the square-root sign is positive for the base-edge equilibrium that exists
throughout region iii∪iv∪vi and negative for the additional equilibrium that exists only in
region iii. As before, because r1(x
±
1b, 0) and r2(x
±
1b, 0) are the roots of a quadratic equation,




1b, 0) and δCE(x
±
1b, 0) are easily
determined as (extremely cumbersome) continuous functions of α and θ on using (1). The
minimum value of δCE(x
+
1b, 0) over region iv of Figure 1 is 0 at (1/2, 1), so the eigenvalues




1b, 0) over region IV is 0; it occurs along the
boundary with region iii between (αc, θc) and (
1
2
, 1), and along the upper edge between
(1
2




1b, 0) < 0,
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and so (x+1b, 0) is always a saddle point in region iv. The eigenvalues are likewise real
on region vi of Figure 1, since the minimum value of δCE(x
+
1b, 0) over region vi is 0 at




1b, 0) over region vi is 0; it occurs along the
boundary with region v between (αc, θc) and (
1
3
, 0), and along the lower edge between
(1
3
, 0) and (1
2




1b, 0) > 0.
Furthermore, the sum of eigenvalues r1(x
+
1b, 0) + r2(x
+
1b, 0) has a maximum over region vi
of 0, uniquely at (1
2
, 0), implying that the sum of eigenvalues is always negative within
region vi. So (x+1b, 0) is always a stable node in region vi.
Over region iii of Figure 1, the eigenvalues are still real because the minimum value
of δCE(x
+
1b, 0) over region iii is still 0 at (1/2, 0), the same as for region vi. If the negative





a maximum of 0 along the boundary from (αc, θc) to (
1
2
, 0) that separates region iii from
region vi, implying that the additional base-edge equilibrium is always a saddle point. If





over region iii has a minimum of 0 along the curve from (1
2
, 0) to (1
2
, 1) where δb(α, θ) = 0
and along the curve from (1
2
, 1) to (αc, θc) where σ1b(α, θ) = 0; these two curves sepa-
rate region iii from region ii and region iv, respectively. Moreover, the eigenvalue sum
r1(x
+
1b, 0) + r2(x
+
1b, 0) has a maximum of 0 at (
1
2
, 0) and (1
2
, 1); it also has a local maximum
of approximately −0.0356 at the point where the curve δb(α, θ) = 0 separating region ii
from region iii has a vertical tangent, which we denote by (α∗, θ∗). Because the eigenval-
ues have a positive product and negative sum throughout the interior of region iii, we
conclude that (x+1b, 0) is invariably a stable node. Note that α∗ is the only zero between 0
and 1 of the cubic equation
α3 − 2α2 + 3α− 1 = 0. (D.11)
Thus α∗ ≈ 0.4302 with θ∗ ≈ 0.691.
The second polynomial is more straightforward to deal with. It is easily verified that
Q2(0) must have the sign of σ0s = −σ0b, that is, the opposite sign from Q1(0); whereas
Q2(1) must have the sign of −{(2−α)(1− θ) + (1− α)αθ}, which is always negative. The
equation Q2(x2) = 0 has two real roots whenever the discriminant δs is positive, where
δs(α, θ) = α
2(1− θ)2 + 4{1− (1− α)θ}{(1 + α2)θ + 2α(1− θ)− 1}. (D.12)
So there is a narrow subset of region v ∪ vi in Figure 1(a) to the right of the dashed
curve where Q2(0) < 0, Q2(1) < 0 and δs > 0, implying that Q2(x2) = 0 has two real
solutions. Points within this narrow region do not, however, correspond to a pair of
side-edge equilibria because ∂Q2/∂x2|x2=0 = −12α(1 − θ)(1 − ωL) and ∂Q2/∂x2|x2=1 =
−1
2
(1 − θ){2 + α(1 − ωL)} are both negative, implying that Q2(x2) = 0 where x2 < −1.
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Thus no point in region v ∪ vi of Figure 1 corresponds to a side-edge equilibrium. A side-
edge equilibrium (0, x2s) does exist for every (α, θ) in region i ∪ ii ∪ iii ∪ iv, and δCE(0, x2s)
has a minimum of 0 along its boundary with region v ∪ vi, establishing that the eigenval-
ues are real; but the product of eigenvalues has a maximum of 0 on the same curve, as
well on the line joining (0, 1) to (1, 1) where θ = 0. So r1(0, x2s)r2(0, x2s) < 0 within region
i∪ ii∪ iii∪ iv, implying that (0, x2s) is invariably a saddle point. We do not present the ex-
plicit expression for x2s as a function of α and θ because it is so surprisingly cumbersome.
We have now classified all possible equilibrium points on the boundary of ∆. Any
other equilibrium point must lie in its interior and therefore satisfy φ1(x1, x2) = 0 =
φ2(x1, x2). We have not been able to establish analytically that φ1(x1, x2) = 0 = φ2(x1, x2)
and (x1, x2) ∈ ∆ imply x1 = x2 when ρ = 0, but an exhaustive numerical search of the
parameter square S reveals that all interior equilibrium points do in fact lie on the open
line segment Λ defined by (17). Let (p, p) ∈ Λ be such an equilibrium point, and define
Q(p) = {σ0b + 3α}p2 + αp+ σ0b (D.13)
where σ0b is defined by (D.8). Then
2(1− θ + αθ)φ1(p, p) = {p+ θ(1− 2p)}Q(p)
2(1− θ + αθ)φ2(p, p)) = −{(1− θ)(1− p) + θp}Q(p),
(D.14)
and because (p, p) ∈ Λ guarantees that p+θ(1−2p) and (1−θ)(1−p)+θp are both positive,





(1 − α)(1 − θ + αθ), ∂Q/∂p|p= 1
2
= {2 + (2 − α)θ}α + 1 − θ and
∂Q/∂p|p=0 = α are all positive. If also Q(0) > 0, that is, if (α, θ) lies in region III of Figure
1(b), then Q(p) > 0 for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
2
and there is no interior equilibrium. Elsewhere,
however, that is for (α, θ) in region I ∪ II of Figure 1(b), Q(0) < 0 < Q(1
2
) implies that an




α2 − 4σ0b{σ0b + 3α}+ α
(D.15)
with σ0b defined by (D.8). Note that the term inside the square root sign must be positive,
because σ0b is negative for all (α, θ) in region I∪II while σ0b+3α is positive for all (α, θ) ∈ S.
As before, an explicit expression for δCE(p∗, p∗) as a continuous function of α and θ
is straightforward to obtain, but it is far too unwieldy for its presentation to serve any
useful purpose. The function assumes the value zero on the closed curve shown in Figure
1(b). Inside the curve, throughout region II, δCE(p∗, p∗) < 0 implies that the eigenvalues
are complex, and so (p∗, p∗) must be a focus. Outside the curve, in both (disconnected)
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subregions of region I, δCE(p∗, p∗) > 0 implies that the eigenvalues are real. But the eigen-
value product r1(p∗, p∗)r2(p∗, p∗) has a minimum over region I ∪ II in Figure 1(b) of zero,
all the way along the boundary between (1/2, 0) to (0, 1) that separates region I ∪ II from
region III. So r1(p∗, p∗)r2(p∗, p∗) is never negative, implying that an interior equilibrium is
never a saddle point. Hence (p∗, p∗) is a node in region I and a focus in region II.
The eigenvalue sum r1(p∗, p∗) + r2(p∗, p∗) assumes the value zero along the curve in
Figure 1(b) that extends from the point (α2, 0) ≈ (0.628, 0) where region II touches the
line θ = 1 to the point (
√
2 − 1, 1
2
) ≈ (0.414, 0) where region II touches region III. Below
this curve, r1(p∗, p∗) + r2(p∗, p∗) is negative (with a minimum of −14 along the line α = 1);
above the curve, r1(p∗, p∗) + r2(p∗, p∗) is positive (with a maximum of about 0.0662 where
α ≈ 0.304 and θ = 1). Hence (p∗, p∗) is a stable node in region Ia, a stable focus in region
IIa, an unstable focus in region IIb and an unstable node in region IIa.
We have now in effect determined the final destination of (x1(t), x2(t)) for all (α, θ) ∈ S.
For (α, θ) in region III of Figure 1(b), the unique local attractor is a stable node that lies at
(1, 0) in ∆ for (α, θ) to the left of the dashed curve and at (x1b, 0) in ∆ for (α, θ) to the right
of the dashed curve; because this node is the only local attractor, it must also be the global
attractor. So the population evolves to either a monomorphism of C or a polymorphism
of C and U as indicated in Figure 5.





, 1) bounding region iii, the unique local attractor is (p∗, p∗), which is a stable node for
region Ia and a stable focus for region IIa. A unique local attractor is also the global at-
tractor, so (x1(∞), (x2(∞) = (p∗, p∗) for region IIa∩ iii, whose phase plane is illustrated by
Figure 3(a): the population evolves to a polymorphism of all three strategies. The phase
plane for region Ia ∩ iii is similar, the main difference being that trajectories are straighter
near a node than near a focus (as illustrated by Figure 6(a)). For (α, θ) on the left of the
dashed curve, however, in a narrow wedge sandwiched between the dashed lines con-
verging on (1
2
, 0) and bounded above by the solid curve where r1(p∗, p∗) + r2(p∗, p∗) = 0,
the base-edge equilibrium (x1b, 0) is also a local attractor. Here (x1(0), x2(0)) determines
which local attractor corresponds to (x1(∞), x2(∞)). Regardless of whether (p∗, p∗) is a
node or a focus, it lies between the origin and a separatrix that joins the unstable node
at (0, 1) to a saddle point at (x−1b, 0). If (x1(0), x2(0)) lies to the left of this separatrix,
then (x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (p∗, p∗); if (x1(0), x2(0)) lies to the right of the separatrix, then
(x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (x+1b, 0) instead. This outcome is illustrated by Figure 3(b).
We have already established that (1, 0) and (x1b, 0) are stable nodes in regions iv and
iii, respectively; they are also unique local attractors in these regions. They are there-
fore also globally attracting, that is, (x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (1, 0) for (α, θ) in region iv and
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(x1(∞), x2(∞)) = (x1b, 0) for (α, θ) in region iii, as illustrated by Figure 2(a) and Figure
2(b), respectively. It remains only to determine the final destination of (x1(t), x2(t)) for
(α, θ) in the intersection of regions i ∪ ii and Ib ∪ IIb. For this subset of S, the only equi-
librium point—either on the boundary of ∆ or in its interior—is an unstable node (in
a tiny subset of region Ib) or an unstable focus (in a much larger subset of region IIb),
and (x1(t), x2(t)) approaches a limit cycle surrounding the unstable source at (p∗, p∗) as
t → ∞. Strategy D persists, but within a periodic polymorphism of all three strategies, as
opposed to one in which the three proportions are fixed. For illustration, see Figure 4.
Appendix E. Effects of allowing k, λ and ρ to depart from their reduced-model values
In §3 we focused on our reduced model by assuming extreme parasitoid density (a →
∞ or k = 0), perfectly decisive size advantage (λ → ∞) and no owner advantage (ρ = 0).
In §4 we considered effects of relaxing those assumptions by allowing the relevant param-
eters to depart from their limiting values in §3, but we provided few details, especially
concerning the effect of increasing k or decreasing λ, so that we could focus on the more
important effect of increasing ρ. Here we present those details, considering each of k, λ
and ρ in turn. First we consider k.
ρ = 0, λ → ∞, k > 0
When parasitoid density is not extreme (k 6= 0) but there continues to be no owner
advantage (ρ = 0) and size advantage remains perfectly decisive (λ → ∞), for sufficiently
large α there still exists an interior equilibrium (p∗, p∗) that allows strategy D to persist
either statically or dynamically, although its strength is lower than for k = 0. This result is
illustrated by Figure 4(b), where k has increased from 0 to 5×10−7 but all other parameter
values are unchanged from §3. It may be surprising that a small increase in k induces so
marked a reduction in the amplitude of the limit cycle, but the larger and unsurprising
point that is that increasing k reduces the strength of strategy D in the polymorphism
(from 0.245 to 0.23): intuitively, size advantage in a contest is less likely to be favoured
if a contest is less likely in the first place. When the value of k is further increased, the
strength of D decreases further and the amplitude of the limit cycle continues to shrink
around the unstable focus until it eventually morphs into a stable focus at k ≈ 7.03×10−5
(with p∗ ≈ 0.223). Although (p∗, p∗) remains a stable focus until k ≈ 0.206, at which
it morphs back into an unstable focus surrounded by a small-amplitude limit cycle, it
remains the global attractor only until k ≈ 0.142, at which value (1, 0) morphs from a
saddle point into a second local attractor, this time a stable node. As k increases from
k ≈ 0.142 to k = 0.25, D persists only if (x1(0), x2(0)) lies in a steadily shrinking region
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between (0, 0) and a separatrix that joins a base-edge saddle point to a side-edge saddle
point; and at k ≈ 0.25, (p∗, p∗) disappears entirely by merging with the saddle point at
(0, 0) as (1, 0) becomes the global attractor. Thus, in this instance, strategy D is bound to
persist only if the probability that a host is never found does not exceed about 14%; and
if it exceeds 25%, then it is guaranteed to be extinguished instead.
Although the effect of increasing k is similar for other (sufficiently large) values of α,
the complexity of changes to phase-plane topology we have just described is not typical,
being a consequence of (α, θ) lying in region E of Figure 5; for (α, θ) in region D, the
progression is far simpler. Suppose, for example, that α = 0.6 = θ, corresponding to
Figure 3(a). Then as k is steadily increased from 0, (p∗, p∗) remains a stable node as it
moves steadily along Λ towards the origin, merging with the saddle point there at k =
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≈ 0.327 as a stable node emerges from (0, 0) to progress along the base edge of ∆
as k increases further. This base-edge equilibrium remains the new global attractor until
k ≈ 0.392, at which it reaches (1, 0). Thus, in this instance, strategy D is bound to persist
as long as the probability that a host is never found does not exceed about 33%; if it is
larger than that, but less than about 39%, then a polymorphism of C and U takes over;
and if it exceeds that higher value, then only C persists. An analytical expression for the
critical value kc at which strategy D disappears is kc = −σ0b(α, θ)/{1 − θ + (2 − α)αθ},
where σ0b is defined by (D.3); note that kc must be positive, because σ0b < 0 for all (α, θ)
lying in region D ∪ E of Figure 5 (Appendix D). Note also that kc increases with α.
The essence of the above discussion is that increasing k decreases the strength of strat-
egy D by shifting (p∗, p∗) along Λ until it becomes unstable, ultimately to be absorbed by
the origin. Note, however, that this description presumes ρ = 0. When ρ > 0, as discussed
in §4, increasing k still shifts (p∗, p∗) towards the origin, but it it is no longer constrained
to lie in Λ. For an illustration of this point, compare Figure 6(b) to Figure 6(d).
ρ = 0, λ < ∞, k = 0
Now we consider λ. When ρ = 0 = k but λ is finite, in place of (D.14) we obtain
2(1 + λ)(1− θ + αθ)φ1(p, p) = −{p + θ(1− 2p)}R(p)
2(1 + λ)(1− θ + αθ)φ2(p, p)) = {(1− θ)(1− p) + θp}R(p)
(E.1)
where
R(p) = (4α− (1 + λ){3α+ σ0b})p2 + α(1− λ)p− λσ0b + (1− α)2θ − 1
= (α− σ0b)p2 + αp+ (1− α)2θ − 1− λQ(p)
(E.2)
with Q and σ0b defined by (D.13) and (D.8), respectively. For (p, p) ∈ Λ to be an interior







(1 + λ)(1− α)(1− θ + αθ) and ∂R/∂p|p=0 = α(1− λ) are both negative, a zero in (0, 12)
requires a large enough λ to ensure P (0) > 0, implying in particular that σ0b < 0. So (α, θ)
must lie in region I ∪ II of Figure 1(b), and the interior equilibrium is absorbed by the
origin when P (0) = 0 or
λ =
(1− α)2θ − 1
σ0b
. (E.3)
As long as λ exceeds this value, however, an interior equilibrium (p∗, p∗) ∈ Λ will exist,
where p∗ is the only zero of Q(p on (0,
1
2
); an explicit expression for p∗ can be found, but it
is too unwieldy to be useful. Note that R(p) = 0 implies Q(p) = 0 in the limit as λ → ∞.
For illustration, again consider α = 0.6 = θ, corresponding to Figure 3(a). Here, as λ is
steadily reduced, (p∗, p∗) remains a stable node as it moves steadily down the line x1 = x2
towards the origin, and the strength of strategy D in the associated polymorphism of all
three strategies does not differ appreciably from its value in the limit as λ → ∞ until λ
reaches double figures; for example, p∗ = 0.282 for λ = 99 and p∗ = 0.229 for λ = 9 (as
compared to p∗ = 0.287 in the limit as λ → ∞). The decrease of p∗ then accelerates, but
(p∗, p∗) remains the global attractor until at λ = (2213 + 1140
√
19)/2137 ≈ 3.36 it morphs
from a stable focus into an unstable one, as a saddle point and a stable node emerge
together at x1 ≈ 0.214 on the base edge of ∆. As λ is further reduced, (p∗, p∗) continues
down x1 = x2 towards the origin as the saddle point moves to the left, while the stable
node becomes the global attractor and moves to the right; both the saddle point and
(p∗, p∗) are absorbed by the origin at k ≈ 3.05, in agreement with (E.3). The phase-plane
topology resembles that of Figure 2(b), except that there is an extra saddle point on the
roof edge of ∆ and (1, 0) is an unstable node. Subsequently, the base-edge node remains
the global attractor for all λ > 1.
For a second illustration, again consider α = 0.5, θ = 0.8, corresponding to Figure
4(a). Here, as λ is steadily reduced, (p∗, p∗) remains an unstable node surrounded by
a globally attracting limit cycle until λ = 7, at which a saddle point and a stable node
emerge together at x1 =
1
2
on the base edge of ∆. As λ is further reduced, (p∗, p∗) continues
down x1 = x2 towards the origin, morphing from an unstable focus into an unstable node
at λ ≈ 5.19, while the saddle point moves to the left and the stable node becomes the
global attractor and moves to the right; both the saddle point and (p∗, p∗) are absorbed by
the origin at λ = 4, in agreement with (E.3). Subsequently, the base-edge node remains
the global attractor for all λ > 1. First we consider k.
ρ > 0, λ → ∞, k = 0
Finally we consider ρ. In §4 we made the point that although a side-edge equilibrium
corresponding to (α, θ) in region v ∪ vi of Figure 1 is impossible if ρ = 0, for ρ = 0
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sufficiently large ρ may induce a side-edge global attractor. In this regard, it is instructive
to consider the limit as ρ → 1. From (15) we find that φ2(0, x2) = (1− x2)Q2(x2), where in
place of the expression in (D.7), obtained for ρ = 0, the quadratic polynomial Q2 is now
defined by
Q2(x2) = αωN(1− ωLθ)(1− x2)− (1− θ){ωLωN(1 + x22) + (ωL2 + ωN2)x2} (E.4)
with ωL and ωN defined by (1). Since Q2(0) = α(1− θ)ωN > 0 and Q2(1) = θ− 1 < 0, there
must exist precisely one x2s ∈ (0, 1) such that Q2(x2s) = 0. So a side-edge equilibrium
(0, x2s) exists. Expressions for x2s and hence r1(0, x2s), r2(0, x2s) as explicit functions of
α and θ are again too cumbersome for presentation. As in Appendix D, however, we
can show that both eigenvalues are always negative inside S. So (0, x2s) not only always
exists in the limit as ρ → 1, but also is always a stable node.
Appendix F. Ownership asymmetry in the absence of size asymmetry
Here we present some analytical results obtained for the limiting case in which ρ > 0
but λ = 1 and k = 0, so that ownership asymmetry obtains at high parasitoid density










x1{θx1 + (1− θ)(1− x2)}S(x1, x2)
(F.1)
where
S(x1, x2) = αρ(1− x1)2 + (1− ρ)(1 − x2)2 + 2x2 − α(1 + x12). (F.2)
Because the terms in squiggly brackets in (F.1) are both positive inside ∆, any stationary
points other than the three vertices of ∆ must lie on an arc of the hyperbola with equation
S = 0. This curve intersects the interior of ∆ only if 2α+ρ > 1, and then always intersects
x2 = 0 to the right of the origin. Hence there are no interior or side-edge stationary points
(other than the vertices) if 2α+ ρ < 1, in which case, (1, 0) is the global attractor; whereas
if 2α + ρ > 1, then every point within ∆ on the curve S = 0 is a stationary point. In
this case, as t → ∞, (x1(t), x2(t)) will approach the curve from above or below according
to whether (x1(0), x1(0)) lies above or below the curve, since
dx1
dt
is positive or negative
according to whether (x1, x2) lies above or below the curve while the signs are reversed
for dx2
dt
. Hence strategy C invariably persists in the absence of size asymmetry, whereas
both strategy D and strategy U risk elimination through random drift, since every point
along S = 0 is only metastable. Note that θ becomes irrelevant in the absence of size
asymmetry.
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Appendix G. Phase-plane analysis for θ = 1
2
with k = 0, λ → ∞
Proceeding as in Appendix D and using the same methods, in place of (D.3)–(D.5) we
obtain
4(1 + α)r1(0, 0) = c(α, ρ), r2(0, 0) = −r1(0, 0)
4(1 + α)r1(0, 1) = 2− (1− ρ)α2 + 2αρ, 2r2(0, 1) = 2− α(1− ρ)
4(1 + α)r1(1, 0) = 2α(α+ ρ+ 1)− 1 + ρ, 2r2(1, 0) = 2α+ ρ− 1
(G.1)
where
c(α, ρ) = 2α− (1− ρ)(1− α2) (G.2)
and 0 < α, ρ < 1; the curve c = 0 forms the right-hand boundary of the unshaded region
2 in Figure 8. Inspection of (G.1) shows that (0, 0) is invariably a saddle point, (0, 1) is






ρ2 + 3− ρ− 1}, (G.3)
α > 1
2
(1−ρ) or α lies between these bounds. In particular, (1, 0) is an attractor when (α, ρ)
lies in region 1 of Figure 8. It is also the global attractor for that region.
A “roof-edge” equilibrium (x1r, x2r) with φ1(x1r, x2r) = 0 = φ2(x1r, x2r) and x1r+x2r =
1 exists whenever α > 1
2
(1 − ρ); here φ1 and φ2 are defined by (16). When it exists (that
is, when (1, 0) is an unstable node), this equilibrium is invariably a saddle point because
r1(x1r, x2r)r2(x1r, x2r) < 0 throughout the relevant region.
For equilibria on the base edge of ∆ where 0 < x1 < 1, x2 = 0 or on the side edge
where x1 = 0, 0 < x2 < 1, (D.6) continues to hold but with
4(1 + α)2Q1(x1) = α
{
{(1 + α2)ρ− (1 + α)2}x12
− {2α2ρ+ (1 + α)(3ρ− 1)}x1
}
− (1 + α)c(α, ρ)
4(1 + α)2Q2(x2) = −{2α + (1− ρ)(1 + α2)}x22
− {2ρ+ α(1 + α)(1 + 3ρ)}+ (1 + α)c(α, ρ)
(G.4)
in place of (D.7). A base-edge equilibrium occurs where Q1(x1) = 0 for x1 ∈ (0, 1). Because
∂Q1/∂x1|x1=1 is invariably negative, no such equilibrium is possible if Q1(0) and Q1(1) are
either both positive or both negative with ∂Q1/∂x1|x1=0 < 0. These constraints alone ex-
clude much of the parameter square S̃ in Figure 8; and much of what remains is excluded
by the constraint that if Q1(0) and Q1(1) are both negative with ∂Q1/∂x1|x1=0 > 0, then
the equilibrium exists only if Q1(x1) has a positive maximum, that is, only if (α, ρ) lies to
the left of the curve with equation
α{2α2ρ+ (1 + α)(3ρ− 1)}2 = 4(1 + α)c(α, ρ){(1 + α)2 − (1 + α2)ρ}, (G.5)
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in which case there exists a pair of base-edge equilibria, (x±1b, 0). Thus a base edge-
equilibrium (x+1b, 0) exists when (α, ρ) lies in either the unshaded region 2 of Figure 8





1b, 0) has a minimum of 0 while r1(x
+
1b, 0) + r2(x
+
1b, 0) has a maximum of 0,
(x+1b, 0) is always a stable node; it is also the global attractor in region 2. It continues to
be a stable node in region 5 and typically remains the final destination of (x1(t), x2(t)),
but in this region there also exists either a stable side-edge node or a stable interior focus
(according to whether region 5 intersects region 3 or region 4); whereas r1(x
−
1b, 0) is always
a saddle point.
A side-edge equilibrium (0, x2) = (0, x2s) occurs where Q2(x2) = 0 for x2 ∈ (0, 1).
Because ∂Q2/∂x2|x2=0, ∂Q2/∂x2|x2=1 and Q2(1) are all invariably negative, the condition
for such an equilibrium to occur is Q2(0) > 0 or c(α, ρ) > 0. Thus a side-edge equilibrium
(0, x2s) occurs when (α, ρ) lies in either region 3 or region 4 of Figure 8; however, it is a
stable node only when (α, ρ) lies in region 3, since it is only here that r1(0, x1s)r2(0, x1s)
has a minimum of 0 while r1(0, x1s) + r2(0, x1s) has a maximum of 0. Except where region
3 intersects region 5, (0, x2s) is also the global attractor for region 3.
For (α, ρ) in Region 4 of S̃ there always exists an interior equilibrium (p∗, q∗) ∈ ∆ such
that φ1(p∗, q∗) = 0 = φ2(p∗, q∗). Its boundary is the curve with equation d = 0, where
d(α, ρ) = φ1(0, x2s) (G.6)
is an extremely cumbersome expression that we do not present. This boundary extends
from (αd, 0) = (
√
2−1, 0) ≈ (0.414, 0) to (1, ρd) ≈ (1, 0.52) in Figure 8, and it divides region
5 into a left-hand part that intersects with region 3 and a right-hand part that intersects
with region 4. In both parts, there are two local attractors. In the left-hand part, these
attractors are both stable nodes, one on the side edge and one on the base edge of ∆; in
the right-hand part, the attractors are a stable base-edge node and a stable interior focus;
and in both parts of region 5 there is a second base-edge equilibrium, a saddle point,
which attracts a separatrix emanating from the unstable node at (0, 1), as in Figure 3(b).
In both cases, the equilibrium to the left of this separatrix (either the side-edge node or
the interior focus) has only a very small basin of attraction, and unless (x1(0), x2(0)) lies
within this tiny region, (x1(∞), x2(∞)) is the base-edge node to the right of the separatrix.
To illustrate, we pick a point in each part, each represented by a dot in Figure 8. For
(α, ρ) = (0.39, 0.1), the attractors are nodes at (0.2472 × 10−1, 0) and (0.4442, 0), with the
separatix ending at (0.7459 × 10−1, 0); and for (α, ρ) = (0.42, 0.02), the attractors are a
focus at (0.2394× 10−1, 0.4131× 10−1) and a node at (0.5681, 0), with the separatix ending
at (0.9817× 10−1, 0).
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